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ABSTRACT

North Korea gained the moniker “Hermit Kingdom” as the country largely
withdrew from interactions with the West during the Cold War. However, NGOs have
quietly worked within the country since a famine in the mid-1990s pressured the North
Korean government to request international aid. How did these NGOs begin operations in
North Korea? How are the rules and regulations governing these NGOs decided? This
research attempts to answer these questions through interviews with individuals who
have worked or are currently working in North Korea, as well as, through related
literature, both academic and non-academic. The findings are as follows: the rules that
apply to each organization contain general trends, but are determined on a one-by-one
basis with several key factors heavily influencing what regulations apply. Case studies
are included to illustrate this point as well as a discussion of the influence NGOs have on
North Korean policies.

Keywords: North Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Non-Governmental
Organizations, NGOs, Regulation, Policy Influence
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Today the nickname “Hermit Kingdom” has been appropriated to describe the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or North Korea. It implies that North Korea is
withdrawn, different, and disconnected from all the ties that bind the modern
international community together. The transfer of ideas, economic interdependence,
human movement – all of these are hallmarks of globalization. According to conventional
wisdom, all of these have passed by North Korea without so much as stopping for a
glance. However, conventional wisdom is wrong.
Since the mid-1990s, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have been
increasingly active in the DPRK. These organizations work in a myriad of areas within
the country, providing medical assistance in combatting tuberculosis, increasing foreign
educational opportunities for North Korean students, and improving the nutritional status
of the people among many other causes. For a country that so many believe is entirely
sealed off from the world, a limited number of foreign workers form a continuous
presence on the ground. They have, in a sense, passed through the hermit’s shell and
they have come to know his home quite well.
Though North Korea is not nearly as isolated as many of us believe, there is – as
the saying goes – a grain of truth at the heart of most perceptions. North Korea is
1

certainly wary of foreign influence. The country continuously gauges foreign interest,
has relatively few economic connections to the world, and works tirelessly to control the
movement of anyone in its borders. Because of these circumstances, the fact that NGOs
have developed a consistent presence in the country is striking. It is also an historic
opportunity to learn. This thesis attempts to derive lessons from a few of those NGOs
and their time in North Korea.

2

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Methodology
This thesis is based on qualitative research performed in two ways. The first, a
literature review of available information from academic authors such as Andrei Lankov
in The Real North Korea, as well as older works like Paved with Good Intentions: The
NGO Experience in North Korea by L. Gordon Flake and Scott A. Snyder. Material not
produced from academic circles was also used, such as news articles related to specific
NGOs, government white papers from the United States of America Congressional
Research Service, and documents from two organizations affiliated with the United
Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme.
The second form of research was conducted by interviewing eight individuals
who have at one point or another worked for an NGO in North Korea or who have
experience with inter-Korean relations. These interviews were conducted over the span
of seven months in multiple locations and through video calls. All interviews were
conducted in a flexible format following a set list of guiding questions,1 but allowing for
the use of follow-up questions. The individuals interviewed, ordered by date of
interview, are the Reverend Bill Moore, Director Heidi Linton, Director Matt Ellingson,
1

The Two Sets of Guiding Questions – one for NGOs and the other for academic experts – are
located in the Appendix of this document.
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Dr. Jong Yun Bae, Director Matt Reichel, Dr. John Linton, Mr. Erich
Weingartner, and Mr. Victor Hsu.2 From these interviews, multiple common threads were
highlighted in an attempt to develop an outline of the regulatory system in place,
typology of the factors that can influence the conditions an NGO operates under, and an
understanding of the different forms of influence NGOs can have in North Korea.
Limitations
Before beginning, there are specific limitations in this study that need to be
addressed. First and foremost, this research was done with no knowledge of the Korean
language. As a result, it is likely that literature in South Korea, where the topic of NGOs
working in North Korea should draw more interest, has been almost entirely missed
despite attempts to the contrary. Also, developing contacts among South Korean and
European NGOs was more difficult than expected. These factors limited this research
largely to the North American perspective of NGO activities. Research has certainly been
impacted by this in that no NGOs with residency in North Korea were interviewed
(which mostly includes European NGOs), and no South Korean NGOs were interviewed.
This may not have been an entirely negative development, however, as it made it easier
to draw parallels among the NGOs most directly involved in this research. Also, the
presence of Erich Weingartner and Victor Hsu, who both worked with NGO consortiums
and began their interactions with North Korea through the World Council of Churches,
among those interviewed provided a wider view of NGOs from other world regions, just
not in specific detail.
2

For those interested in reading about specific NGOs four case studies are included for Christian
Friends of Korea, The Pyongyang Project, Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, and
Samaritan’s Purse in the Case Studies section.
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Other less topic-specific factors, such as a small number of interviews, also
influenced this research. However, given that the NGO community working in North
Korea is small and spread out and that some NGOs did not wish to speak on this topic,
the limited number of interviews is understandable. Also, the fact that this research was
conducted by an undergraduate student could have deterred some NGOs or individuals
who preferred interviews with more experienced and prominent researchers. Another
factor affecting data collection, is that initial interest over NGOs in North Korea peaked
in the early 2000s and has cycled with North Korea’s importance in the international
community. This has limited the amount of academic work related to this research.
Finally, this research has been qualitative and would likely benefit from collection of
related quantitative data.

5

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF OUTSIDE ACCESS

Korea and Foreign Influence
Understanding why North Korea is extremely cautious regarding any foreign
influence geopolitics is an enlightening place to begin. The Korean peninsula is
separated from China by the Yalu River and lies only 130 miles from Kyushu,3 the
closest of Japan’s four main islands. This placement has allowed modern day South
Korea to flourish between two large markets. However, in the past the peninsula’s
position ensured the Korean nation fought continuously to maintain its territorial
sovereignty and cultural identity.4
Even during the Joseon Dynasty, which ruled Korea for nearly five centuries,
Korea closely guarded its independence. Yearly tribute missions were sent to Beijing to
maintain cordial relations with Ming China. Major invasions by Japan in 1592 and 1598
were warded off through the combined efforts of the Joseon and Ming armies. Heavy
foreign influence subsided until the late 1800s when Korea became a target of Meiji-era
Japan, Qing China, and Imperial Russia. All three states were highly invested in the
outcome of the race to carve a sphere of influence in northeast Asia. Ultimately, the
Korean peninsula was forced from its tributary relationship with Qing China after the

3
4

The distance from Busan, South Korea to Fukuoka, Japan.
A map of Northeast Asia is in the Appendix under the title (Document III).
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Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and Japan formally annexed the territory into the Japanese
Empire in 1910.
Thus, it may be argued that Korea’s wariness of foreign influence can be
attributed to its long history in struggling for domestic safety from political, cultural, or
military forces. Added to this history is the knowledge that nationalist sentiments were
sweeping through East Asia during the late 1800s and early 1900s. For a country already
keenly aware of its difficulty in maintaining domestic control, nationalism must have
crystallized the sentiment that foreign people should not be allowed to dictate the fate of
the Korean nation. Kim Il Sung, the first Great Leader of North Korea admitted later in
life to being a nationalist, as well as a communist.5
Another aspect of North Korea’s reticence to allow foreign access comes from the
country’s policy-guiding concept of Juché. Kim Il Sung and other leaders of the Korean
Workers’ Party developed Juché as reaction to Korea’s inability to control its own affairs
during the first half of the 20th century.6 Juché is often defined as “self-reliance.” This
principle inspired North Korea to set up its own factories and plan economic
development in much the same way that other Communist countries did during their
initial break with capitalism. In short, Juché calls for a form of autarky.
Juché is the policy embodiment of the desire to reduce foreign influence within
Korea, and the philosophy provides its own example. Juché was branded as a form of
Communist thought, even though it is largely Nationalist, to ensure that North Korea

5

Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (New York:
Oxford, 2013), 6.
6
L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North
Korea (Westport, CT: Prager, 2003), 1.
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could claim a unique Communist perspective.7 It is easy to imagine that the motivation
for the development of Juché came from a desire to separate Korean intellectual currents
from contemporary Communist centers of thought, specifically Moscow and Beijing.
The Juché philosophy was expressed through the development of domestic
industrial capacities in order to protect the North Korean state from any destabilizing
economic forces. For example, in the past North Korea used limestone (which is
abundant within the country) to create a synthetic fabric known as Vinalon. Despite
higher costs and requiring more physical inputs than foreign synthetic materials, Vinalon
became the material of choice within the country. After a period of strong growth
through the 1960s, the North Korean economy began to slow down and remained in a
steady equilibrium through most of the 1980s.
During the 1980s, North Korea began to lose the luxury of asking allies within the
Communist bloc for loans and aid, which were exceptions to the idea of self-sufficiency
espoused by Juché. First, the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping widened the
ideological split between North Korea and the People’s Republic of China. Then the
political reforms destabilized the Soviet Union leading to the dissolution of the
Communist bloc’s largest, though admittedly, moribund economy. The loss of these
resources forced North Korea to begin looking outward, but it does not obscure the facts.
North Korea is extremely cautious when allowing any foreign influence within the
country’s borders and is, in fact, often opposed to it.
Famine

7

Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea, 67.
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It should be remarked that this isolation from the outside world functioned for an
astonishing amount of time. Kim Il Sung built a society that could meet the people’s
needs (with large amounts of aid from China and the Soviet Union)8 without the need for
the average North Korean to interact with foreigners. The North Korean government
acted as the only interface between the outside world and the North Korean people.
The system that Kim Il Sung built began to fall apart shortly before his death in
1994. The first event that unsettled the North Korean system was the movement of China
towards capitalist reform during the 1980s; this reduced China’s willingness to support
North Korea’s inefficient economy and forced North Korea’s elite to rely more heavily
on the Soviet Union’s generosity. This dependency dealt North Korea a particularly hard
blow after the Soviet Union fell in 1991. In fact, between 1989 and 1998 the North
Korean economy shrank to half its previous size.9
The yields of the North Korean agricultural sector, heavily reliant on industrial
inputs such as fertilizer, followed the trends of the greater North Korean economy. As a
result, the once reliable Public Distribution System was forced to provide smaller rations.
In 1995, the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization found
that the food reserves in North Korea rapidly declined beginning in the early 1990s,
indicating that the food security had been deteriorating long before North Korea opened
its borders to aid.10

8

Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea, 73-74.
L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, Paved With Good Intentions, 2.
10
World Food Programme, Full Report of the Evaluation of DPRK EMOPs 5959.00 and 5959.01
“Emergency Assistance to Vulnerable Groups”, Rome: World Food Programme Office of Evaluation,
Published September 2000, Accessed January 14, 2014,
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp007326.pdf.
9
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The chronic food insecurity within North Korea was exacerbated in 1995 by
heavy rain and extensive flooding. Domestic agricultural yields in 1996 fell to 2.5-2.8
million metric tons against the 5.0-5.5 million metric tons of grain required to feed North
Korea’s population. During the famine, which continued acutely from 1995 until 1998, it
is estimated that anywhere between 450,000 to 2 million people died (between 2.5% and
10% of the entire North Korean population).11 Though the estimations vary widely, it is
clear that this was a devastating time for the citizens of North Korea.
International Access
The famine that began in 1995, however tragic, did lead to a watershed moment.
The North Korean government called on the international community to help address the
famine conditions and provided limited access within the country. For a country so ready
to close its borders to foreigners almost entirely, this shift in policy was monumental and
unprecedented. Dr. Jong Yun Bae, of Yonsei University, discussed the change as a shift
in strategic policy, not necessarily a shift in North Korean officials’ perceptions of the
international community. For him the North Korean opening to NGOs represents a new
awareness of benefits from NGOs: “It’s something like a business model to earn
economic benefits from international society.”12 The possibility that North Korea sees
foreign aid as an asset in the country’s international diplomacy toolbox is recognized by
other academics as well.13 The decision to open to international aid is doubly significant
within the context of Juché because North Korea was no longer asking allies of similar
11

Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea, 79-80.
Dr. Jong-Yun Bae. Interview by author. Digital Recording. Yonsei University in Seoul, South
Korea, July 24, 2013.
13
Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control
in North Korea,” International Security 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 64-66.
12
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political ideologies for assistance. Instead, they were directly undercutting Juché’s
emphasis on self-sufficiency by asking the entire international community for assistance.
Many governments were hesitant to provide aid until the bleak conditions in
North Korea could be confirmed and as a result NGOs initially filled the gap. According
to Erich Weingartner, who worked in North Korea in the 1980s with the World Council
of Churches and served as the first director of the Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU), during
the first few months donations outpaced those of governments.14 FALU served as a
monitoring agency for a consortium of NGOs until its closing in 2005 and resided within
the offices of the United Nation’s World Food Programme.
NGOs and the North Korean agency regulating their entry, the Flood Damage
Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC), had to create new norms on both sides.15 From the
beginning, North Korea worked tirelessly to control the organizations coming into the
country and project a positive image of the country despite the famine. This included
refusing Korean speaking aid workers from entering the country and requiring that
monitoring trips be scheduled in advance,16 precluding the use of surprise checks to
ensure aid was reaching designated regions of the country. For the NGOs’ part,
education about NGOs was important because there is no equivalent in North Korea
where the government embodies civic society.17 There were also strong efforts to impress
upon North Korean officials the importance of verification and successful attempts to

14

Erich Weingartner, “Memoirs of an Aid Worker in the DPRK,” CanKor, Published between
February 14, 2012 and March 18, 2014, Accessed January 1, 2014,
http://vtncankor.wordpress.com/memoirs-of-an-aid-worker-in-the-dprk/.
15
Erich Weingartner, “Memoirs of an Aid Worker in the DPRK”, CanKor.
16
L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, Paved With Good Intentions, 6.
17
Erich Weingartner and Victor Hsu, Interviews by author, Digital Recording.
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gain residency within the country for aid workers (particularly for NGOs in the European
Union).
As both NGOs and the government agencies they work with have become more
comfortable and familiar with each other, many of these restrictions have softened.
Interactions with local North Koreans are less controlled, Korean speakers are allowed
into the country, and projects are now often collaborative and development-oriented.
This shift in project focus was afforded by the easing of famine conditions in the country
in the early 2000s, which has allowed NGOs and government agencies to direct more
resources towards meeting other needs and building capacity.
Program Diversification
This collaboration and familiarity has led to an interesting shift in NGO projects
in North Korea. Famine conditions eased by the early 2000s, but even in 2013 North
Korea still required 340,000 metric tons of cereal imports to meet the population’s food
needs.18 Despite the persistent need for food, this improvement has allowed NGOs to
shift their focus into areas of development and away from emergency aid.
Today there are many different development-oriented projects underway in North
Korea by NGOs. To begin with, several groups continue to provide targeted food aid in
many forms to the people of North Korea. Two groups, Christian Friends of Korea and
the Eugene Bell Foundation, have focused their efforts on combatting North Korea’s
tuberculosis epidemic through a variety of initiatives. Christian Friends of Korea,
18

World Food Programme, “Harvests in DPR Korea Up Five Percent For Third Year, But Chronic
Malnutrition Persists,” World Food Programme, Published November 28, 2013, Accessed January 7, 2014.
http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/harvests-dpr-korea-5-percent-third-year-chronic-malnutritionpersists.
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working in partnership with experts from Stanford University School of Medicine, has
developed North Korea’s first ever National TB Reference Laboratory. Which is needed
to diagnose and support the treatment of individuals with TB and multi-drug resistant
(MDR) TB.19 Samaritan’s Purse, famous for its Operation Christmas Child program, has
developed projects assisting farming development and dental health in the country.20 The
Pyongyang Project, another group based in Vancouver, operates as a social venture
providing tours of North Korea. The group uses the resulting income to fund study
abroad opportunities for North Korean university students.21 This is only a small portion
of the organizations currently active in North Korea.
This diversification of aid efforts should be viewed as a redefining trend in North
Korea’s interaction with the outside world. First, it establishes long term commitment
both by aid organizations and the North Korean government. In the early days of the
1990s famine, the North Korean government focused on securing emergency food aid
and agricultural inputs, as opposed to development works. This focus dramatically
limited the intensity and duration of long term interactions between North Korea and
foreign aid providers22. With the diversification of NGO activities into developmentoriented projects, more intense and longer term interactions have occurred.
Second, the diversification of aid has increased North Korea’s exposure to
globalization. As stated above, key hallmarks of globalization include the movement of

19
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Richard Stone, “Public Enemy Number One,” Science Magazine, Volume 340, April 26, 2013,

20

Matt Ellingson, Interview by author, Digital Recording, Samaritan’s Purse Headquarters in
Boone, NC, June 12, 2013.
21
Matt Reichel, Interview by author, Digital Recording, Videoconferencing Between Seoul and
Vancouver, August 2, 2013.
22
Brianna M. Smrke, “North Korea Hunger, Politicized,” Undercurrent.
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people, economic activity, and the exchange of ideas. Several NGOs have permanent
resident status (especially European NGOs which is a requirement for government aid),
and many others make multiple visits to the country each year. Of course, food aid and
other goods enter the country as part of NGO operations. Finally, and possibly most
importantly, North Korea is now more heavily linked to the transfer of professional and
technical ideas. Samaritan’s Purse, for example, has hosted dental clinics between
Western dentists and their North Korean counterparts to discuss techniques for improving
dental health. The diversification of programs has altered the NGO relationship with
North Korea.

14

CHAPTER 4

THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

The regulatory system put into place by North Korea follows a fairly predictable
pattern. First, discussion must occur between NGOs and individuals within the North
Korean government, outlining the broad parameters of working and exploring mutual
areas of interest and possible engagement. This forms the North Korean government’s
gateway, which allows screening of interested NGOs for trustworthiness and reliability.
At this point, each NGO project is sponsored within North Korea by a specific
government agency. The NGO then prepares a letter of application to visit, outlining the
needs, participants, and proposed schedule for a visit related to achieving proposed goals.
The letter is circulated to the relevant North Korean government entities for
consideration, and some weeks later, a schedule is agreed upon for a visit. This includes
confirmation that visas for delegation members will be forthcoming. The NGO then
arranges transportation into North Korea. The delegation is met at the airport by the
sponsoring government agency who guides aid workers within the country, organizing
food and shelter along the way. These agencies also ensure that NGOs are working
within the guidelines stated by their letter of application, as well as domestic laws. From
this point forward the process is repeated for each new related visit or project.
As stated earlier, an NGO must develop relationships within North Korea. This
can be accomplished through personal connections or by working with an organization
15

already active within North Korea. Among the groups that have entered the country this
connection has been established in a myriad of ways. Christian Friends of Korea, for
example, was formed based on a family missionary history on the Korean Peninsula and
developed connections by assisting Billy Graham’s visits to the country in the early
1990s.23 The founder of the private Pyongyang University of Science and Technology
was actually detained under suspicions of being a spy, based on his frequent appearance
and requests to start a university in North Korea.24 Other NGOs were formed largely by
individuals of Korean ancestry which is the case, according to their website, for Christian
Association of Medical Missions.25
During interviews with multiple individuals who had worked with NGOs
operating in North Korea, the question was asked, “Would it be possible for a new
organization to begin programs in North Korea today?” In almost all of the interviews,
individuals stated it would be possible, though some disagreed on whether entrance was
more or less difficult today than in the past. However, almost every person interviewed
stated it would be easier to enter North Korea by working with an NGO already
established there.26 As a prime example, Stanford University’s participation in the
development of the National TB Reference Laboratory was facilitated by Christian

23

Heidi Linton, Interview by author, Digital Recording, Christian Friends of Korea Headquarters in
Black Mountain, NC, June 11, 2013.
24
Bill Powell, “The Capitalist Who Loves North Korea,” CNN Money, Published September 15,
2009, Accessed December 18, 2013, http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/14/magazines/fortune/
pyongyang_university_north_korea.fortune/.
25
Christian Association for Medical Missions, “About…,” Christian Association for Medical
Missions website, Accessed January 7, 2014,
http://christianassociationformedicalmissions.org/about.html#history.
26
Multiple interviews recorded during this research mentioned this, including interview with
Matt Ellingson, Heidi Linton, Bill Moore, Matt Reichel, and Erich Weingartner.
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Friends of Korea’s already established relationship.27 Another possibility for NGOs
interested in North Korea would be to bolster the resources of NGOs already operating in
North Korea through donation. Though not developing new relationships with North
Korean officials, this alternative was brought up in two separate interviews with the
Reverend Bill Moore, a board member of Christian Friends of Korea, and Erich
Weingartner.28 29
Once an NGO has developed relationships, it can propose a project to its North
Korean partners or, in some cases, an NGO’s North Korean partners may request
assistance on an issue. This occurred with Christian Friends of Korea during its early
history as the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation when prize money awarded for
tuberculosis work in South Korea was applied to a North Korean project and resulted in
the North Korean government’s request for assistance in tuberculosis.30 Once significant
interest for a project arises from North Korea and sufficient resources are gathered by the
NGO, the entry process begins.
Initially, the details of a project are defined in a trip application, or perhaps more
formally through a Letter of Intent, which is sent to the specific government ministry that
is sponsoring the project. A Letter of Intent must be sent for new projects undertaken,
even if the NGO and sponsoring government ministry have a well-established
relationship.31 Once the trip application or Letter of Intent is approved, the appropriate

27

Richard Stone, “Public Enemy Number One,” Science Magazine, 422.
Rev. Bill Moore, Interview by author, Digital Recording, Phone Interview between Bowling
Green, KY and Lexington, KY, April 17, 2013.
29
Erich Weingartner, Interview by author, Digital Recording, Videoconference between Wilmore,
KY and Callander, ON, Canada, January 6, 2014.
30
Rev. Bill Moore and Heidi Linton, Interviews by author, Digital Recording.
31
Matt Reichel, Interview by author, Digital Recording.
28
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visas are secured, usually through North Korea’s consulate in Beijing. The two main
types of visas issued specifically allow only temporary visits or short term residency
(generally requiring renewal every three months). According to Victor Hsu, long term
residency is largely reserved for organizations from countries that have diplomatic
relations with North Korea, which allows for norms of international relations to be fully
implemented.32 33Also, according to Erich Weingartner, organizations operating through
an Intergovernmental Organization (IGOs) with ties to North Korea, like the United
Nations or the European Union, can gain residency due to other member states’
relationships.34 Large IGOs with their own projects in North Korea, such as the World
Food Program, negotiate more permanent Memorandums of Understanding35 because
they often work within a wider geographic and programmatic scope.
This means only European NGOs have residency, largely because they are
required to do so by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office in order to
receive funding.36 In 2005, the North Korean government removed the residency status of
NGOs operating in the country, forcing many into following the visit model used by
North American NGOs in the country. This created a dilemma for the European NGOs,
and as a compromise the North Korean government designated them official
representatives of the European Union (which in legal terms, nominally removed NGOs

32

Victor Hsu, Interview by author, Digital Recording, Videoconference between Wilmore, KY and
Taiwain, January 23, 2014.
33
Currently, only twenty-five countries have diplomatic relationships with North Korea. Among
them are many current or former communist countries including China, Russia, and many eastern
European states. Sweden has longstanding diplomatic relationship and has been joined by the United
Kingdom and Germany. Brazil most recently established diplomatic relations with North Korea.
34
Erich Weingartner, Interview by author, Digital Recording.
35
Matt Reichel, Interview by author, Digital Recording.
36
L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, Paved With Good Intentions, 7.
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from residency in the country).37 What this means is that future NGOs may find it
extremely difficult to gain resident status if they attempt to do so. Resident status would
likely only be obtained by an organization completely backed by countries with
diplomatic relations with the DPRK, or a strong intergovernmental body like the United
Nations.
By and large, most non-European NGOs working in North Korea operate by
using a visit model. When shipments of aid or equipment are sent into North Korea,
NGOs will visit to monitor their aid delivery and begin work on projects related to the
transported equipment. While this does make monitoring and communication more
difficult, it does not make doing projects untenable. The Pyongyang Project, which
guides cultural visits in North Korea and uses the proceeds to fund study abroad
opportunities for North Korean university students, has opened an office in Beijing
staffed by a North Korean citizen.38 This has allowed the organization to navigate the
different ministries within the North Korean government and maintain stronger relations.
Other groups make multiple visits a year as a way of staying in touch and keeping up
with projects.
Once a visiting NGO team reaches North Korea, the group is met by officials
from the sponsoring government ministry, who accompany the team and facilitate the
visit. In the beginning years of North Korea opening to aid, this sponsorship was used as
a method of controlling NGOs’ access within the country.39 While the restrictions
enforced by these “minders” often frustrated NGOs trying to maintain transparency
37
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among donors at home, they are easier to understand when viewed through the North
Korean government’s desire to control outside influence and serve a practical purpose in
a country most NGO workers had never seen before. Victor Hsu, who worked in North
Korea through the World Council of Churches, the Private Voluntary Organization
Committee, and World Vision, pointed out the utility of minders in this story: “I have
told North Koreans, ‘You know there are so many complaints about your being busy,
about your being the watch dog. Why don’t you just tell them to go?’…they wouldn’t
know where to go and besides there are no car rentals. So, you have to rely on
government vehicles and you will probably have to pay an arm and a leg, just to get
lost.”40 According to many of the interviews performed during this research, many of the
most restrictive rules put in place have been relaxed.41 This relaxation can be attributed
to the growing familiarity with expectations on both sides, and to the strengthened trust
and relationships between North Korean minders and the NGOs for which they are
responsible.
During the interview with Erich Weingartner, an important observation was made.
During the opening days of NGO entry into North Korea, things were more fluid.
Standard operating procedures, so to speak, were not yet in place among North Korean
minders, who did not know what their boundaries were. Thus, for those NGO workers
willing to push the envelope, an element of “randomness” could be added during
monitoring visits that may be less possible under today’s more defined relationships and
guidelines.42 According to Heidi Linton, the Director of Christian Friends of Korea, this
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decline in flexibility has been partially reversed by cell phone usage and the resulting
increase in communication speed when requesting permission for additions to trip
itineraries.43
To add to the history regarding the government agencies that work with an NGO
entering North Korea, when the initial famine occurred, the North Korean government
wanted to establish a bureaucratic body to regulate NGOs’ entry into the country. As a
result, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Council (FDRC) was established by the North
Korean government to handle incoming groups. The FDRC existed from late 1995 until
2005, during which time it acted as the official relief gateway into North Korea. In 2005,
the FDRC was replaced by multiple new organizations facilitating receipt of NGO
assistance from the major aid donating areas of the world. The Korean American Private
Exchange Society (KAPES) is one of these organizations, and similar organizations for
other regions were formed, such as the Korea Canada Cooperation Agency (KCCA).
Depending on the project undertaken by an NGO and where they have been able
to develop relationships within North Korea, some NGOs also work with technical
government agencies. Some prominent examples come from the Ministry of Public
Health. Christian Friends of Korea is able to do much of its work in tuberculosis with
that agency,44 and Samaritan’s Purse has also worked with the Ministry of Public Health
to coordinate professional meetings between North Korean dentists and dentists from the
West.45
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One general structure of North Korea’s government that also affects the
regulatory system is the government’s tendency toward stove-piping. Stove piping refers
to a hierarchical system in which information moves only vertically. Different
government agencies within North Korea rarely interact or transfer information
horizontally.46 NGOs are affected by this system in two ways. The first is that NGOs can
utilize only the resources available to their sponsoring government agency. In this
situation, working with a technical government ministry can be more effective because
they may already have project specific resources. The second way stove piping impacts
NGOs is through the comfort level of North Korean government workers. Because
government agencies do not often interact, many government bodies within North Korea
are still not acquainted with foreign NGO workers, and thus are more leery of their
efforts.47 This means the recent development of NGOs working with technical
government ministries, as opposed to KAPES, has often resulted in more rapid and
deeper achievement of results. This development has also allowed more North Koreans
to become comfortable in collaborating with foreign NGO workers.
Despite the relative predictability of the process NGOs follow in developing
operations in North Korea, the structure of the system is actually surprisingly flexible due
to a deeply cultural emphasis on trust and personal relationships. Among the interviews
conducted, each individual cited duration of contact as a key indicator of strong
government-NGO relationships.48 This is similar to other cultures in East Asia. The only
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inflexible piece of the system is the enforcement of domestic laws, which can be vague.
As a result, actions in North Korea must be conducted in an honest and straight forward
manner. However, because much of the system is relational, NGOs can improve the
situations they operate under simply by remaining invested in their North Korea
programs and by showing consideration and respect for the guidance provided by North
Korean counterparts.
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CHAPTER 5

REGULATIONS

NGOs working in North Korea operate under specific and unique conditions.
However, it is important to note that the terms rules and regulations used throughout this
paper should be understood loosely. A couple of individuals interviewed during this
research questioned the idea of concrete rules and systematic regulations as terms that
even apply to NGOs operating in North Korea.49 Since the terminology rules and
regulations was used to frame this paper, the wording has remained the same, but these
terms denote more about the conditions, environment, and general trends of operating in
North Korea rather than a strict, systematically applied set of rules.
With that said, there are strong general trends in what regulations NGOs,
particularly visiting NGOs, must operate under. First, NGOs operating in North Korea,
like their counterparts in other countries, have to adhere to domestic laws. Second,
resident NGO workers have privacy within their own living quarters and in the
diplomatic compounds.50 NGOs are also expected to cover the costs of their lodging and
personnel transportation, as well as pay a service charge for material shipments in
country.51 However, outside of those areas NGO workers must be accompanied by a
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minder who supervises their actions. For NGOs working with temporary visas, this
surveillance is constant.
One point of contention between NGOs and the North Korean government,
especially in the early years of large humanitarian aid shipments, was the ability to spot
check villages and towns receiving aid. At that time, the North Korean government
required a notification period of one week before spot checks could be carried out.52
When the NGO workers interviewed discussed the diversion of aid to healthy groups in
North Korean society like the military, most felt current monitoring practices were
effective. Heidi Linton, described their monitoring process as “pushing” and “pulling”
aid through the system.53 There is now enough contact between NGOs and the
communities they now serve to ensure that aid is reaching its intended targets. In
addition, Victor Hsu, who headed a consortium of NGOs working in North Korea and
previously worked for World Vision, stated in an interview that the notification period
had been negotiated down to twenty-four hours.54
According to the reviewed literature and these interviews, the regulations that
NGOs active within North Korea must observe are decided using six factors: (1) North
Korean domestic law, (2) national origin of the NGO, (3) sponsoring government agency,
(4) familiarity with North Korean contacts, (5) the terms of the trip application or Letter
of Intent, and (6) the amount of resources the NGO commands. It is important to note
that among these factors only domestic law affects all NGOs in the same way. The other

52

Erich Weingartner, “Memoirs of an Aid Worker in the DPRK”, CanKor.
Heidi Linton, Interview by author, Digital Recording.
54
Victor Hsu, Interview by author, Digital Recording.
53

25

factors affecting what conditions NGOs operate under are variable between different
NGOs.
These regulation determining factors can be further classified into two categories
by asking a simple question: Does an NGO have the ability to alter this factor? The
factors of sponsoring government ministry, familiarity with contacts, terms of the trip
application or Letter of Intent, and the command of resources can all be altered by an
NGO to some degree or another.55 In fact, the system is quite flexible when diligent,
sincere attempts are made to improve relations. Obviously, foreign NGOs have little
control over the domestic laws of North Korea or their national origin, and these factors
cannot be altered.
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CHAPTER 6

THE UNALTERABLE FACTORS IN REGULATION

As mentioned above, the two unalterable factors that affect how regulations and
rules are applied to each NGO are the domestic laws of North Korea and the national
origin of the NGO in question. While these factors may not be altered by NGOs, it is still
important to be aware of their contexts and ramifications.
Domestic Law
Domestic laws are unique in their status affecting every NGO equally. However,
this is not a situation unique to North Korea’s regulations. NGOs are expected to operate
under the laws of the countries they enter (assuming the state has not failed in the
region).56 This is the standard within the NGO community, particularly among
organizations providing aid and development assistance.
Due to its human rights reputation abroad, North Korea is often an exception to
this norm. The government of North Korea maintains a high degree of control, but the
state still vigorously defend against an active “black market” of NGOs and individuals
that ignore the country’s domestic laws. In recent history, the BBC has controversially
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sent undercover reporters into the country,57 other groups send up balloons that drift into
North Korea and drop anti-government fliers over the countryside, and a reduced though
stable market exists for helping North Koreans cross the Chinese border and travel to
countries willing to grant asylum.58 For most countries, outside observers would
acknowledge that these are infringements on sovereignty, however in North Korea’s case,
the standard of compliance with domestic law is often ignored. For any NGO pursuing
an official relationship with North Korean officials, the “black market” activity of NGOs
raises the bar and makes it imperative that aid workers be in full compliance with the law.
In this sense, NGOs operating legally in North Korea likely maintain some of the best
practices among NGOs in the world when it comes to compliance with the domestic law.
National Origin of the NGO
The other unalterable factor affecting NGOs is their country of national origin.
Given North Korea’s history over the last sixty years, a definite hierarchy of countries
has developed. South Korean NGOs must surmount the most obstacles in developing
projects within North Korea.59 In fact, despite the dozens of NGOs based in South Korea
that provide aid for North Korea,60 the on-the-ground presence of South Koreans (outside
of the government negotiated Kaesong Industrial Zone and a few tourist ventures) in the
North is negligible. The next most challenged group comes from the United States,
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which is still technically at war with North Korea. However, American NGOs have been
largely successful in developing a visit model for program development in North Korea.
Canadian NGOs operate in the same manner as American NGOs do at this point. The
NGOs granted the most flexibility – based on their nationality – originate from Europe,
which is viewed as more politically neutral. As mentioned earlier several European
NGOs still maintain residency in North Korea.
The national origin of an NGO does not only effect an NGO’s operation based on
past history between countries. Another aspect of NGOs is that they are affected in North
Korea by the modern politics of their home country. Dr. John Linton, who works in the
International Clinic of Yonsei University’s Severance Hospital and has worked in North
Korea had this to say: “I think that’s what’s frustrating is when the American government
would do something negative towards North Korea, then we’re directly affected and
sometimes sort of held responsible or you know, at least we hear about it…NGOs are
totally apolitical, but the reality is, the most frustrating thing is, you’re affected by
politics.”61
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CHAPTER 7

THE ALTERABLE FACTORS IN REGULATION

This section concentrates on the factors affecting regulation that NGOs can
control. Again, these factors include the NGO’s sponsoring government ministry,
familiarity with contacts, terms of the trip application or the Letter of Intent, and the
amount of resources an NGO commands. The North Korean system is based on the
development of relationships and trust.62 An NGO’s ability to sincerely and intentionally
foster relationships will directly improve its ability to influence these factors and
improve.
Government Partner
First, an NGO’s sponsoring government ministry can have a large impact on the
way rules and regulations are enforced. This variability derives from the government
ministry’s own intentions. If a government ministry is focused on working closely with
an NGO and has the resources to aid projects when needed, then the partnership will
likely be less restrictive. However, in the words of Matt Reichel, the Director of the
Pyongyang Project, “sometimes you realize that it’s not going anywhere, their goals are
not oriented towards your goals or they’re financially motivated to the extent that it’s
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actually hampering the development of any kind of project that you wanted to start.”63 In
these situations it can be quite difficult to work with an organization and the restrictions
that apply to an NGO may be more rigorous.
When determining why there is so much variability between government agencies
in North Korea, it helps to look at the condition of North Korea’s current governmental
structure. The government is much less centralized than during the Kim Il Sung era (the
time period occurring from independence until the early 1990s). Likely due to the lack of
government resources, many government agencies are now fiercely competitive, both
internally and externally, because they must generate revenue for their own budgets. This
can make it extremely difficult on NGOs that attempt to work with multiple government
agencies because these agencies guard their access to resources (including those
presented by NGOs) and because they do not collaborate horizontally.64
Also, with less dependence on the central government and a growing market
economy,65 some North Korean agencies largely focus on filling out their budgets. These
organizations may be unfit partners for some NGOs because they attempt to gather funds
without being clear about their intentions. This is a difficult situation for NGOs, which
operate transparently to maintain the support of donors. However, there are also
government agencies in North Korea that are more transparent. The Pyongyang Project’s
current government agency partner, Pyongyang Technology Services Center (PTSC)66 is
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upfront in stating that every Letter of Intent that is signed will include a $3,000
coordination fee.67
The flipside of the North Korean government’s disjointed nature is this: many
government agencies, within the limits of their influence and power, pursue their own
objectives and loosely adhere to visions cast by the leadership of the country.68 Erich
Weingartner confirmed this situation: “Often there was a conflict because the Foreign
Ministry and Interior Ministry, Ministry of Security, Ministry of Agriculture, et cetera.
They were all competing for resources from the outside.”69 The resulting competition is
intense, so it is possible for some NGOs to be selective and collaborate with partners who
have similar interests, powerful technical capabilities, and greater levels of transparency.
The government agency an NGO collaborates with can greatly enhance both
organizations’ abilities to meet desired goals.
Familiarity with Contacts
Second, the familiarity with contacts can be altered. This can be viewed as one of
the easiest factors to alter because it simply requires being intentional with North Korean
contacts and the project over a long duration of time. An interesting idea posited during
one interview is that familiarity and comfort can be cultivated in two ways within North
Korea, through casual and official means.70 Among the casual events, Matt Ellingson,
the Director of Program Development for Samaritan’s Purse, cites karaoke, pool, ping
pong, and viewing natural landscapes as “fertile ground for a true relationship to build.”
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A way of improving relations in official capacities can be to successfully complete
projects. Heidi Linton states it this way: “We try not to promise anything, but to over
deliver.” As simple as it sounds, proving trustworthiness and capacity is an extremely
effective way of improving familiarity and comfort with North Koreans because they
value those traits highly.
The ability to develop familiarity with contacts can also benefit an NGO by
insulating it from negative situations. Long term relationships are also extremely
important if an NGO feels it is necessary to give criticism. The commitment shown by
developing relationships likely clarifies whether the criticism is intended as constructive
or as shaming, which sometimes comes from the international community, the recent UN
Report on North Korea being an example. According to Erich Weingartner, “North
Koreans, they have a long memory and they like relationships. You may think not
because they’re restricting the relationships, but no, if you stick with it for a long time…I
can say very critical stuff about them and to their face that a lot of other people do and
they honor that. They honor the long term relationship. By and large.”71
Terms of the Trip Application or Letter of Intent
The terms of the Trip Application or the Letter of Intent are also alterable factors
affecting what NGOs must do to operate in North Korea. While not a contract, the Letter
of Intent is still a form of accountability for NGOs and their North Korean counterparts.
It may also allow the North Korean government the opportunity to reign in an NGO
considered to be working too far from its stated purpose. Due to the fact that both
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documents are periodically revised, it is actually a very useful tool for NGOs to alter the
rules and regulations they work under. Periodic revisions allow NGOs to expand and
redirect their projects or change direction completely once a specific project has been
completed.
Having a history of past success is crucial to the successful negotiation of a new
Letter of Intent. There is perhaps no better way to describe this than the words used by
Matthew Reichel of The Pyongyang Project: “As you do a project it becomes mature and
they let you do it again, but they give you a longer leash. So, when you do it the second
time you can start adding in different components that were not possible to do the first
time.”72 In making a trip application for visas or negotiating the Letter of Intent, a history
of success provides more justification of an NGO’s capacity and allows the NGO to
expand and reconfigure its operations in North Korea.
Amount of Resources Commanded By an NGO
Finally, the amount of resources an NGO commands can also influence what
leverage it has in determining its operations. In the past, an NGO bringing larger
quantities of goods into North Korea had a more extensive access for monitoring.73 In
some cases, the amount of money an NGO has available for a project can determine
whether an NGO’s program is even taken beyond the proposal stage. According to Matt
Reichel at The Pyongyang Project, their organization has never been accepted to work on
a project unless the project’s budget was greater than $40,000.74 This experience was not
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universal among all NGOs interviewed.75 The impact of how many resources an NGO
commands may be mitigated by other factors.
Obviously, there are constraints on an NGO’s ability to muster more resources
than they currently do. However, to the degree that this can be altered a change in
desirability for North Korean government agencies also occurs. As mentioned above,
North Korean government agencies often compete for scarce resources, of which NGOs
are one. Due to this, government ministries are more likely to desire a well-resourced
NGO because it directly improves the amount of resources that government ministry can
in turn bring to bear.
NGOs working in North Korea operate in a particularly difficult situation when it
comes to increasing their resource base. Because North Korea is viewed as a rogue state
and often uses military exhibition to force interaction, most notably during the missile
tests of spring of 2013 and 2014, it can be extremely difficult to increase the donor base
due to the political tensions between North Korea and the rest of the world. NGOs do
have the benefit of working on a topic that strikes a chord with those of Korean heritage,
which has been indispensable. However, support for development projects might begin to
fade as South Koreans grow less in favor of reunification76 and increasingly identify
themselves as being a separate nation from North Korea. Religious NGOs meanwhile
have the ability to tap the strong missionary and service oriented mindsets of church
congregations.
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Still, the strong political headwinds involved with working with North Korea
force many NGOs to look for other income sources. As an example, The Pyongyang
Project chose to operate as a social venture because it needed a sustainable source of
income for its efforts to help North Korean students study abroad. Operating on donations
was not a viable option.77 Also, many NGOs receive some funding from the government,
either as grants or as middlemen between state-to-state transactions. Especially in North
Korea, this is a politically based source of funding for both foreign governments and the
government of North Korea.78 An example of this occurred in 2008-2009 when the
United States asked five American NGOs to confirm delivery of 100,000 metric tons of
food aid to North Korea. Despite a successful implementation, the North Korean
government ended these transactions in 2009.79 A ban on providing government
supported food aid was enacted in 2012 by the United States Congress after North Korea
tested another long-range missile in April of that year.80
Another major factor affecting NGO’s ability to increase their donor base is the
perception that North Korean aid is diverted from its intended recipients. However,
many of the individuals interviewed heavily discounted the occurrence of diversion.
Erich Weingartner, the former Head of the Food Aid Liaision Unit, questioned the
definition of diversion because some organizations send aid with few requirements for its
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use,81 meaning NGOs that specify aid uses are respected. Matt Ellingson, of Samaritan’s
Purse, stated that most occurrences of aid diversion took place in the late 1990s when
NGOs were first beginning operations in the country.82
Both of these arguments stand up in reason. As NGOs and North Korean
government officials became acclimated to each other and their systems (we must
remember that North Koreans did not originally understand the concept of a civic society
independent from the government), some aid was likely diverted. However, because
NGOs now understand how to adeptly monitor their aid and more importantly, because
North Korean officials now appreciate that accountability improves the willingness of
donors and NGOs to provide aid, diversion is no longer an issue. It is likely that any
diversion of aid occurring today in North Korea is the opportunistic kind that would be
seen in any country where resources are scare.83 The intentional and systematic diversion
of aid by the government is highly unlikely.84
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CHAPTER 8

CASE STUDIES

There are clearly a myriad of factors and inputs that influence NGO activities in
North Korea. NGOs can express interest in working with North Korean officials in
multiple ways and, as a result, the path to entry for many NGOs can vary greatly. Also,
the factors discussed above can impact NGOs before and once they begin operating in the
country. These characteristics are indicative of the lack of systematic regulation of NGOs
in North Korea. Interactions are handled on a case-by-case basis with general trends
visible.
Common experiences among NGOs are derived from norms in the country, such
as the presence of “minders” or sponsorship of a government ministry. To highlight
general trends, but also to show the variety within each NGO’s interactions in North
Korea, consider the brief case studies below, presented in alphabetical order. These will
largely address the path of entry for each represented NGO and discuss some of the
regulation determining factors that currently affect them.
Christian Friends of Korea (CFK) began as an official organization in April 1995
and is based in Black Mountain, North Carolina. Originally, the organization operated
under the name of the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation. A founding member of the
Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation initially developed relationships with North Koreans
38

during a ping pong visit in 1979 and maintained those connections with members of
North Korea’s then observer mission at the United Nations in New York. When Billy
Graham visited North Korea in the early 1990s, these connections were used to negotiate
the terms of his visit and fostered familiarity. The organization, being founded months
before the flooding that sparked famine in North Korea, immediately responded to the
unfolding disaster by shipping brown rice from Louisiana to North Korea as emergency
aid.
A couple of years later, the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation donated an
ambulance to North Korea. The ambulance was purchased with prize money awarded to
the mother-in-law of CFK’s current Director, Heidi Linton, for her work fighting
tuberculosis in South Korea. When North Korea learned about the prize allowing the
purchase of the ambulance, they requested assistance in dealing with their own growing
tuberculosis issues, which now includes the spread of Multiple-Drug Resistant (MDR)
strains of the disease. From this point onward, the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation
focused almost entirely on tuberculosis related issues working largely with the Ministry
of Public Health.
In 1998, the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation was reorganized and renamed
itself as Christian Friends of Korea to better reflect its motivation and purposes;
meanwhile the Eugene Bell Foundation was newly organized and registered in Maryland.
Each organization now works separately to fight tuberculosis in different provinces of the
country. CFK now works to provide holistic support to about 30 tuberculosis, hepatitis,
and pediatric care centers. CFK’s projects include repair of hospital infrastructure, clean
water initiatives, enhancement of local food security through greenhouse technology,
39

renovation of operating rooms, ongoing food and healthcare assistance, and other
projects. A notable achievement is the development of North Korea’s first ever National
TB Reference Laboratory in Pyongyang, a collaborative multi-year effort with Stanford
University and other expert volunteers that has included significant facility renovation,
equipment delivery, and intensive ongoing training in advanced laboratory diagnostics,
treatment, program development and disease surveillance. Also notable is CFK’s
participation in providing US government food aid to North Korea as part of a team of
five NGOs in 2008-2009.
CFK’s entry into the country during the 1990s is more typical of NGOs in North
Korea, who responded to the famine that began in 1995. The organization has become
successful in expanding emergency aid operations into a technical development program
based on responding to tuberculosis, hepatitis, and other health and nutrition issues within
the country. The organization, drawing resources mainly from private funders, including
individuals, foundations, and churches (including Korean church congregations and those
with missionary ties to the Korean peninsula), leverages a modest cash budget with
considerable in-kind contributions to impact the communities they serve. They also enter
the country at least four times a year, bringing work teams for weeks at a time. These
work teams join with North Korean partners to complete projects. CFK has developed
strong and open contacts within the Ministry of Public Health through frequent visits.
Given the associated political climate, these actions have signaled to North Koreans the
organization’s deep commitment to the country.85 86
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The Pyongyang Project (TPP) was founded in 2009 in Vancouver, Canada with
the intention of building human capacity within North Korea. The founders of the
organization, using strong backgrounds in speaking Mandarin Chinese, developed
contacts with North Koreans in the Chinese city of Shenyang, which is close to the North
Korean border. From there, TPP has developed relationships with seven different
government organizations focusing on different aspects of technical and cultural
education. This activity is supported by TPP’s business in providing tours of North
Korea.
TPP mainly provides opportunities for North Korean university students to study
abroad for long periods of time, between six months and one year (past campuses have
included the University of Cambridge, Yanbian University, and Utrecht University). The
organization also does technical training. In the past TPP has brought women’s health
specialists to North Korea for collaboration and training with local doctors. All of these
programs are funded using a business model focused on alleviating social problems. TPP
recognizes the difficulty in raising donations, which can be unreliable based on political
tensions. The organization, motivated by a desire to avoid paternalism, decided to build a
revenue stream by guiding educational and cultural excursions into North Korea.
The Pyongyang Project’s entry into North Korea in more recent years is actually
rather unusual, as is the organization’s model of covering operational costs. TPP works
hard to approach North Koreans as partners, and co-founder Matthew Reichel has now
been in the country over thirty times, which has led to much stronger relationships. The
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organization has broken the mold by developing relationships with multiple government
agencies and utilizes a revenue stream that is directly linked to North Korea. They have
operated on multiple Letters of Intent and have achieved a level of familiarity that gives
them considerable freedom in interacting with North Korean government ministries.87 88
Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST) officially opened its
doors in 2010. PUST operates as the only private university in the country and has been
on the drawing board of its parent organization the Northeast Asia Foundation for
Education and Culture (NAFEC) for decades. PUST started as a dream of James ChinKyung Kim, an American citizen of Korean ancestry. Mr. Kim originally planned to
found a university in North Korea, but knew he needed money. He came to the United
States from South Korea and developed three strong businesses, concurrently gaining
American citizenship. Using his resources and passport, Mr. Kim managed to found
Yanbian University of Science and Technology in Yanji, China (where The Pyongyang
Project has an office). That university conducts instruction in three different languages,
Mandarin Chinese, Korean, and English, and provided a test run for Mr. Kim’s future
hopes.
YUST now ranks among the top-100 universities in China and its success
attracted North Korean interest. After being held as a suspected spy in Pyongyang and
later released, Mr. Kim was approached by North Korean officials about founding a
university. An official agreement to found a private educational institution in North
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Korea’s capital was filed in March of 2001.89 PUST began as an idea to help North
Korea develop human resources in engineering, health, information systems, finances,
agriculture, and foreign languages. The university has also begun sending its students
abroad for study in Europe. The high level of exposure between North Koreans and the
Western professors teaching their courses is also unique aspect of PUST.
PUST’s founding and operation has much to do with persistence and the ability to
prove the organization’s capacity and trustworthiness through the founding of YUST, as
well as, by providing food aid in the northeastern part of the country. The Ministry of
Education is a government agency that works alongside PUST. Obviously, given the
permanence of PUST, the relationships Mr. Kim has been able to develop are extremely
influential and powerful within the North Korean government. The same applies outside
the country. The construction of PUST was initially funded by Christian congregations
and individuals. Professors, who raise their own living funds, generally come to PUST
from religious-affiliated universities. The massive mobilization of monetary and human
resources is possible due to the organization’s strong fundraising arms in multiple
countries. This level of support is exemplary among North Korea-focused NGOs. PUST
also operates on a residency model unheard of among NGOs not based in Europe.90 91
Samaritan’s Purse is the only non-Korea specific organization among these case
studies and is the humanitarian legacy of Billy Graham based out of Boone, North
Carolina. Billy Graham’s initial interest in North Korea grew from the experiences of his
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wife, who attended a boarding school in Pyongyang (Ruth Graham’s parents were
missionaries in China) before the peninsula was divided. The organization developed its
North Korean contacts directly through Billy Graham and his visits to North Korea. An
initial gift of a motorhome retrofitted as a mobile dental unit began humanitarian and
capacity building projects in the country. Samaritan’s Purse joined in efforts to provide
emergency food aid to North Korea once the call for food aid was made. Samaritan’s
Purse also continued its work in the dental field by forming training centers, providing
equipment, and organizing technical meetings between North Korean dentists and
dentists from the West.
Samaritan’s Purse has handled large amounts of aid at some points. Along with
Christian Friends of Korea, Mercy Corps, World Vision, and Global Resource Services ,
Samaritan’s Purse participated in the USNGO food delivery effort of 2008-2009 as the
middleman between the United States and North Korean governments to transport and
monitor food aid in North Korea. This aid was discontinued in 2009 when the North
Korean government refused to continue receiving aid from the United States government.
A similar aid program was approved by the Congress of the United States and agreed to
with the North Korean officials on Feb 29, 2013, but was cancelled shortly thereafter in
response to the rocket launches of early 2013.
Samaritan’s purse has worked on separate occasions with both the Korean
American Private Exchange Society and the Ministry of Public Health. Their partnership
largely depends on whether a project’s nature is general or related to health. Samaritan’s
Purse also derives funding for its programs from donations through evangelical church
circles; however, given the size of the organization, it commands much greater resources
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than a North Korea-focused NGO normally would. However, the organization still
struggles to attract donors when stories of diverted aid or political tensions arise.
Samaritan’s Purse has been in North Korea long enough to develop strong relationships
in the country which allows North Korean monitors to be more relaxed and trusting.92
Summary of Case Studies
Now among these case studies, several trends appear, with the first issue being the
entry of the NGOs into the country. All four of these NGOs’ initial entries were
predicated on forming individual relationships and trust. Christian Friends of Korea and
Samaritan’s Purse both entered the country following Billy Graham’s early visits and
gained a strong initial purpose while providing food aid during the famine of the mid1990s. Their entry experience was split between two catalysts, one based on the
relationship that was established between Billy Graham and Kim Il Sung, and the other
being based on the precipitating moment of the famine in the country.93 The fluidity of
the situation during calls for aid in the 1990s will likely not be replicated, barring a major
natural or political upheaval, so that avenue of entry likely cannot be used by future
NGOs. However, the enduring lesson from the experience of the entry of CFK and
Samaritan’s Purse is that an NGO’s entry into North Korea can still occur on the currency
of a foreign individual’s relationship with influential officials in North Korea.
The Pyongyang Project and the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology
are examples of what is now probably a more accessible pathway for NGOs to enter the
country of North Korea. To develop a path of entry both organizations used contacts or
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initial operations in northeastern China (Shenyang, Dandong, and Yanji specifically),
which is linked ethnically and economically to North Korea. To use this pathway for
entry into North Korea, NGOs must have Chinese language capabilities, which Matt
Reichel cited as one of The Pyongyang Project’s best assets when building the
organization.94 Using northeast China as a launch point for working in North Korea is
likely to be more dependable than following the path of internationally recognized
individuals entering the country (such as former NBA player Dennis Rodman, who is
sometimes viewed as unstable) or waiting for another call for international aid (which is
unpredictable).
The lens of these case studies also helps in understanding how the regulation
factors create variation in the conditions of NGOs in North Korea (this excludes the
domestic laws of North Korea which apply to all legally operating NGOs equally). The
first is the national origin of these NGOs. The Pyongyang Project is a Canadian NGO,
the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology has strong ties in the United States,
South Korea, and China but is headed by an American, and Christian Friends of Korea
and Samaritan’s Purse are both American. Among the ways this affects NGOs is
residency, since only European NGOs generally gain residency. PUST is unique among
the four as it has managed to gain residency due to the project’s permanence; however,
the campus is within a guarded sector and at present staff and student movement is
severely curtailed,95 which is similar to the experience of Erich Weingartner during his

94
95

Matt Reichel, Interview by author, Digital Recording.
Heidi Linton, Interview by author, Additional Notes and Comments.

46

residency in the diplomatic compound of Pyongyang.96 The other three NGOs all operate
on a visitor model.
The first of the alterable factors is the government agency sponsor an NGO has.
CFK works routinely with the Ministry of Public Health (and occasionally with KAPES)
and has expressed satisfaction in these partnerships.97 The Pyongyang Project works
with Pyongyang Technology Services Center and through them works almost directly
with Kim Il Sung University. Matt Reichel, from The Pyongyang Project, expressed
satisfaction with this setup and believes it has aided their operations compared to
previous partnerships.98 The Pyongyang University of Science and Technology gained
official approval for its operations from the Ministry of Education.99 Finally, Samaritan’s
Purse has worked with both KAPES and the Ministry of Public Health depending on the
nature of their projects. The Pyongyang Project, to the knowledge of this interviewer, is
unique in having worked with ten different government agencies in North Korea
throughout its short history.100
By working with more discipline-focused government agencies such as the
Ministries of Public Health or Education, these NGOs represent the growing trend of
working with organizations beyond KAPES or the Korea Canada Cooperation Agency,
both of which were established in 2005 to work with foreign organizations like NGOs.
According to Erich Weingartner, this trend is crucial in exposing North Korean officials
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to working with foreign NGOs because the government’s stove-piped nature otherwise
prevents officials from sharing their experiences with other government agencies.101
The second alterable factor affecting the rules and regulations that NGOs must
follow is the level of familiarity and trust between NGO workers and their North Korean
counterparts. Christian Friends of Korea counts the relationships they have developed in
North Korea as a considerable asset, and the organization takes great pride in having
provided consistent assistance through the various political climates surrounding North
Korea.102 The Pyongyang Project seems to have put more effort into finding a good
partnership rather than building a long term relationship. However, The Pyongyang
Project is relatively new in North Korea, and this fluidity will probably stabilize now that
comfortable operating partners have been found. For Pyongyang University of Science
and Technology, Mr. Kim’s own strong interest in North Korea and trips to the country
laid the groundwork for success.103 Without strong, developed relationships, developing a
private university in Pyongyang would be all but impossible. Samaritan’s Purse has also
had some of the longest standing relationships with North Korean officials, considering
their entry came before the call for international aid was given.
The third alterable aspect of an NGO’s relationship with the North Korean
government is the trip application or Letter of Intent. During interviews the definition
and frequency of use for the Letter of Intent was not clear. Matt Reichel at The
Pyongyang Project stated that the document was used for every new project.104 However,
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Christian Friends of Korea director Heidi Linton discussed Letters of Intent as being
reserved only for exceptionally large, long-term, and complicated programs. Other
projects were detailed only through the trip application.105 No information regarding
these documents was collected for Pyongyang University of Science and Technology,
which should operate in an entirely different manner due to residency, or Samaritan’s
Purse. However, the importance of documents defining trip and project parameters lies in
the ability to periodically revise these documents. This allows an NGO the flexibility to
develop or expand trips and programs each time, which affects the conditions they
operate under.
The fourth alterable factor affecting the regulations an NGO operates under is the
amount of resources an NGO commands. In this category Christian Friends of Korea is
not a large operation, consisting of a few employees and mostly conducting work through
volunteer power. However, the organization has shown itself capable of mustering
considerable non-monetary resources through major partnerships, such as with Stanford
University, and facilitating USAID food delivery during 2008-2009 by contributing
Korean-speaking and culturally sensitive staff”.106 The Pyongyang Project is also not a
rich NGO; however, it is distinct in having full command of its revenue.107 Though its
tour-based revenue model is still susceptible to political shocks, the fact that The
Pyongyang Project directly controls income means it is insulated from donor concerns
and can develop flexible and experimental programs.
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The two other NGOs deal with much higher levels of donor support and capacity.
Pyongyang University of Science and Technology is considerably well-resourced,
enough so that its parent organization, the Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and
Culture (NAFEC), has been able to build two universities and run other programs,
particularly along the North Korea-China border.108 Much of the support for PUST has
come from the Korean Christian community, but the program has also drawn notable
support from individuals. Malcolm Gillis, the former president of Rice University, and
Ben Rosen, the co-founder of Compaq Computer,109 are among its supporters.
Samaritan’s Purse, run by Franklin Graham, also commands significant resources as an
organization supported strongly by the evangelical Christian community. The
organization operates in multiple countries, so, resources are not focused on North Korea
alone.
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CHAPTER 9

THE IMPACT OF THE NGO ON POLICY

One topic that has not yet been discussed, but was covered in this research, is the
impact of NGOs on North Korea’s own policies (both domestic and foreign). This ability
to influence North Korean government policy is real, but should not be overstated. It is
largely an extension of the actions of individual NGOs and their relationships with North
Korean government agencies. Because the North Korean government is stove-piped, this
influence remains concentrated among specific agencies and does not spread quickly.110
Also, because the NGO community operates as a set of independent functional units,
there is less collective action than is possible.111 Despite those handicaps, however, the
ability of NGOs to shift North Korean government policy is real. According to this
research, NGOs’ direct influence exists in at least three forms of influence: spotlighting,
modeling, and trust-building.
The first form of influence comes in the form of “spotlighting.” Spotlighting can
be defined as drawing attention to particular unnoticed issues or improving the priority
particular issues receive among government agencies in North Korea. A discussion of
this form of influence came from Christian Friends of Korea Director Heidi Linton: “I
think it also helped the North Koreans realize that if we felt it was a critical issue, if we
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were willing to take on such a huge project with enormous risk and expense and make it
actually happen that this was something they needed to do. That this was something they
needed to focus on and I think it helped serve as a catalyst, I really do, which is
amazing.”112 In a sense, spotlighting is the same technique many NGOs use in the United
States as part of civic society; they represent an interest or cause within a region. While
not nearly as powerful, foreign NGOs can perform similar actions within North Korea by
acting as an intermediary between local partners and government officials.
An example of an organization using resources to champion certain causes within
North Korea comes from The Pyongyang Project. Since the fall of the Communist bloc,
the number of North Korean students studying abroad has declined.113 By providing a
form of revenue through its business model, The Pyongyang Project facilitates programs
that are not otherwise open to North Korean university students.114 When an NGO
commits resources to an issue, the strength of spotlighting increases due to the scarcity of
government appropriations for North Korean government agencies. If the North Korean
government still operated from a position of centralized financial strength, as it did until
the mid-1990s, then foreign NGOs would have much less influence over policy priorities.
The second form of influence NGOs have regarding North Korean government
policies is in “modeling.” Due to the economic situation in North Korea and the
decentralized government funding structure discussed earlier, many government agencies
must heavily prioritize their objectives because they do not have the resources to pursue
all desired projects. However, when an NGO brings resources to bear in a specific area,
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it facilitates projects that can yield dramatic benefits. Once these projects advance, the
most successful characteristics are often adapted locally. Modeling is one of the most
dramatic forms of influence because the replication of successful projects multiplies the
impact an individual NGO can have in the country. The impact of modeling rests directly
on the resources and expertise of an NGO rather than the NGO’s ability to draw attention
to issues. Examples of this influence come from the many agricultural development
projects being undertaken in North Korea by groups such as the Mennonite Central
Committee, whose successful experimental projects could be scaled up by the Ministry of
Agriculture.115
It is worth pointing out the spotlighting and modeling can be easily confused.
This confusion largely stems from the fact that spotlighting and modeling often occur at
different times in the same project; a progression takes place from becoming aware of a
problem (among both the NGO workers and the North Korean government) to investing
NGO resources to resolve the problem to investing North Korean resources to expand the
solution. However, the two forms of influence are not inextricably connected. It is easy
to imagine North Korean officials requesting help on a particular issue, as they did in the
initial pleas for emergency food aid in the 1990s. NGOs would have the option of
addressing that issue or ignoring it, but they would not be spotlighting the need. It is also
easy to imagine a financially-limited NGO making recommendations for a project, but
not having the resources to commit to the problem. In this case, the North Korean
government must make the decision to shift resources to that problem without the proof
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of success that modeling provides. In this scenario, the risks of shifting resources are
much greater and thus less likely to occur.
The previous scenario in which the North Korean government approaches an
NGO requesting assistance on a specific issue has led to a phenomenon mentioned earlier
in this thesis: the entry of NGOs, or other organizations such as educational institutions,
into North Korea as partners with already present NGOs. Now almost twenty years after
the calls for aid in the 1990s, the relationship between NGOs outside North Korea is still
fluid and developing. The number of NGOs exiting North Korea has declined
significantly in the last ten years (with Doctors without Borders and Oxfam being the last
major NGOs to leave).116 The number of organizations entering North Korea seems to be
modest, but positive, with the main issue being maintaining sustained contact with and
interest in North Korea. In almost all of the interviews conducted during this research,
partnerships were described as the most effective and quickest ways to begin work in the
DPRK.117 Of course, the collateral put up in exchange for accelerating North Korea’s
interaction with new organizations is the trust between the original NGO and its North
Korean counterparts.
`This development of partnerships and new organizations entering North Korea
begs an extremely important question about one last form of policy influence that NGOs
in North Korea have in trust-building. How do NGOs already present in the country
affect North Korea’s perception and treatment of other foreign NGOs? The answer is
directly and indirectly, but also dramatically. NGOs’ impacts on the perception of other
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foreign NGOs, both within and outside the country, can also be either positive or
negative.118 An illustration that helps is imagining the NGOs in North Korea as part of a
web; every push upward in reputation and every slip downward in reputation by a single
organization pulls the other NGOs along in the same direction. This is particularly true
among NGOs conducting similar projects or working with the same partners.
In some cases, a new level of trust has been so generally established that it
reshapes the policies every foreign NGO operates under in North Korea. An early
example of this was the initial exclusion of Korean speakers from entering North Korea
as part of aid teams. This issue actually became a main point of contention between
North Korea’s attempts to control the flow of information around foreign workers and the
NGO community’s need for transparency to secure donor trust.119 Erich Weingartner
even stated in his interview that he was likely approved by North Koreans as the head of
the Food Aid Liaison Unit due to his lack of Korean language skills.120
However, this prohibition on Korean speakers has been done away with and now
most organizations operate with Korean speakers. Several factors help explain this shift
in government policy: increased trust towards foreign NGOs, the shift towards
development projects requiring more intense interaction, the number of NGOs entering
the country being large enough to make the rule unenforceable,121 and the improved
project outcomes, especially in technical areas, when communications are more
streamlined.122 While many factors likely contributed to the breakdown of the
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requirement that in country aid workers not speak Korean, a key level of trust must have
been achieved that allowed North Korean officials to decide NGO aid with its insistent
demands was worth more than the increased security that might result from restricting
NGOs linguistic access.
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CHAPTER 10

CLOSING STATEMENTS

Implications of This Research
This research has implications for multiple groups, such as the governments of
NGOs operating in North Korea, for those NGOs themselves, and for other NGOs or
individuals that might develop projects in North Korea in the future. First, for the
governments of NGOs operating in North Korea, the first lessons should be drawn on
interactions with North Korea. As is clearly evidenced above, long term, sincere, and
mutually beneficial relationships constitute the most effective way to improve
interactions with North Korean government officials. For democracies, which operate on
an election cycle, the need for long term relationships may be difficult to fill. It will be
politically controversial to establish sincere and mutually beneficial relationships
between North Korea and countries with populations that think of North Korea as a rogue
state or a threat.
Another consideration of the governments of NGOs operating in North Korea is
whether they should encourage the development of NGO operations in North Korea as a
form of Track II diplomacy. There are many possibilities for insulating NGOs from the
shocks of state-state interactions and decisions. The creation of an independent NGO
advisory committee could provide input on how official home government-North Korea
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interactions might alter NGO relationships in North Korea. Also, any legislation
providing aid to North Korea, such as the 100,000 metric tons provided from 2008-2009,
should be designed to with consistency in mind. A sudden halt in aid provision could be
damaging to the reputation of any NGOs collaborating in aid delivery. One final option to
improve NGO relations could be lifting targeted, specific sanctions that allow a wider
definition for humanitarian aid. This tactic should be approached with caution because
sanctions are an important tool in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Some
stories highlight how broad restrictions can be frustrating and ridiculous in the eyes of
NGOs. In one story told by Victor Hsu, the United States government refused to allow
the shipment of tractors to North Korea for agricultural projects because the Taliban had
used them to hide missile launchers during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan123.
There are lessons in this research for NGOs currently active in North Korea as
well. The first is that tighter bonds within the NGO humanitarian aid community should
be developed. This idea was spoken of by Matt Reichel, “The NGOs need to have even a
private communication channel among each other that’s more developed because we
need each other everyone once in a while.”124 In the past, organizations such as the Food
Aid Liaison Unit have coordinated aid and development projects, but these have been
disbanded. The NGO community is knit by personal connections and collaboration,
which was apparent throughout the networking aspects of this research, but much could
still be learned through a centralized private forum. Particularly for new NGOs or
smaller NGOs that sometimes escape notice, an official forum could provide a more
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accessible way of sharing information, developing collaborative projects, and voicing
united concerns.
Developing tighter connections could also yield benefits for NGOs in North
Korea if they reached out to the many NGOs that focus on human rights in North Korea.
There is a wide chasm between these two groups, which are split on the interpretation of
how to alleviate human suffering.125 The humanitarian NGOs operating in North Korea
focus on the positives of engagement while human rights NGOs apply external social and
political pressure in an attempt to end the grievous abuses that occur. A forum could lead
to important dialogue that allows both humanitarian and human rights centered NGOs to
operate more effectively and to create flexibility for both groups if the situation in North
Korea changes. If North Korea began releasing political prisoners or altering its prison
system, human rights organizations may require legitimate involvement on the ground.
The final set of implications this research has is geared towards any NGO that
may become active in North Korea in the future. First and foremost, the growth of
authentic relationships will be the most significant asset an NGO can muster while doing
humanitarian work in North Korea. Second, due to the government’s ingrained desire to
reduce foreign influence, an NGO must maintain best practice standards, with particular
emphasis placed on the equality of partnerships. A high standard of operation will
generate trust and provide proof of capacity. Any NGO interested in North Korea should
also recognize that entry and the initial development of contacts may be slow. Beginning
with smaller projects will allow the NGO and government agency partner to develop a
history of mutual success. This process can be accelerated by partnering with an NGO
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already active in North Korea. Improvements in the ease of operation in North Korea are
largely time dependent, and following through on long-term commitments will reap
major dividends.
Future Research Opportunities
Given the relatively unexamined nature of this topic area, more research
opportunities abound surrounding NGOs operating in North Korea. Expanding the
geographic scope of NGOs involved should be a first priority in future research. Vibrant
NGO communities exist in Europe, and of course, South Korea.126 A combination of
language skills and contacts within these regions would greatly improve the ability to do
research in these regions. The experiences of these NGOs would provide vastly different
perspectives on how NGOs working in North Korea function, considering the country of
origin and other factors affecting them. Also, in the case of South Korea in particular,
research could be augmented by the substantial body of literature concerning North
Korea.
During this research a couple of other questions formed. The first question: Does
the collaboration of NGOs and educational institutions on complicated, multi-disciplinary
projects reduce stove-piping and increase the horizontal communication of the North
Korean government? A second question: Given the connections of The Pyongyang
Project and Pyongyang University of Science and Technology’s connections to northeast
China, what local NGO activity exists in the ethnic-Korean communities in northeastern
China and Japan? Connected to this: what NGO projects occur in the Rason Special
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Economic Zone along the North Korean-Chinese border? A final question that came
about is more concerned with the process of research regarding NGOs in North Korea,
since this has been a highly qualitative research project: In what ways can the relationship
of NGOs and North Korean officials be quantified for larger data collection?
Conclusion
Legal entry into North Korea is often thought to be an oxymoron within the
general public; however, relationships with North Korean government officials have been
developed and greatly improved during the work of NGOs operating in the country.
North Korea is still extremely wary of foreign influence due to a long history of Korean
states fighting vigorously to maintain sovereignty and independence. However, the tragic
famine conditions in the mid-1990s created many more opportunities for governments
and NGOs to begin providing aid to the country, which developed into operations on the
ground.
The regulatory system North Korea has developed to handle the influx of NGOs
is fairly predictable. Initial relationships must be developed and a project or potential
point of collaboration must be discussed and agreed upon. From there, trip applications
or Letters of Intent are used to outline what will occur during a visit and the NGO’s
partnering government agency requests visas to accomplish mutual objectives.
The regulations placed on NGOs have become more relaxed as NGOs and their
North Korean counterparts have become familiar with each other’s standard operating
procedures. Among the factors affecting the conditions NGOs operate under are domestic
law, the national origin of the NGO, government partner, familiarity with contacts, the
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terms of the trip application or Letter of Intent, and the amount of resources commanded
by the NGO. These factors are present in case studies of individual NGOs, where it is
also equally apparent that the North Korean system operates on a case by case basis. This
produces NGOs with both common experiences as well as unique origins and contexts.
NGOs also carry a certain level of influence within North Korea. This manifests
in three different forms: spotlighting, modeling, and trust-building. Spotlighting and
modeling pertain to the impact of where NGOs’ attention and resources are focused,
though modeling directly increases an NGO’s impact because the initial investment in
new projects sets the stage for scalability. Trust-building has more influence in how it
collectively affects NGOs working in the country, as well as North Korea’s openness to
other foreign organizations. Individuals involved with NGOs in North Korea constantly
reaffirmed the importance of developing long-term relationships.
As a finishing remark, the growth of NGO activities in North Korea in the postCold War era is an exciting and positive development in the evolution of relationships
between North Korea and the international community. North Korea is not a mysterious
black hole in our understanding of international politics, despite what night-time pictures
from the International Space Station might otherwise suggest. There is a stable
community of NGO workers, partnering with North Koreans to alleviate the suffering
that occurs in that country. Relationships in particular have been the key to driving these
efforts and maintaining the hope for future improvements in international political
relations with North Korean officials.
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In every interview the question, “What are the biggest misconceptions people
have about doing aid work in the DPRK?” was asked. A common theme emerged during
several interviews. The sentiment is summed up in the words of Matt Ellingson from
Samaritan’s Purse, “North Koreans have to feed their babies in the morning and go to
work and love their family, and they’re not so different from us. With that said, there are
some very, very significant and serious things that need to be dealt with. So, it’s not
simple process, but having dialogue is a good.”127 By entering North Korea and
operating within the existing conditions, NGOs have sparked and perpetuated the longest
lasting constructive dialogue with North Korean government officials in decades.
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APPENDIX A

NGO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How did your organization go about beginning to work in the Democratic Peoples’
Republic of Korea (DPRK)? Did you discover any misconceptions when you began your
work in the DPRK?
2. When and why did you first enter the DPRK?
3. What rules and regulations did your organization have to comply with to begin
operations in the DPRK? How are those rules put in place or negotiated?
4. Are there limits on your organization’s interactions with DPRK citizens or to certain
areas within the country?
5. Do you believe The Pyongyang Project or other organizations working in the DPRK
have had any impact on how North Korea treats foreign organizations?
6. What types of interactions or projects have improved your relationships within the
DPRK (with the government or with other groups)? Have any interactions or projects led
to worsened relationships within the DPRK?
7. In your experience, are foreign NGOs granted the same privileges in North Korea or
are there differences between organizations in what they are allowed to do?
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8. Have you encountered any frustrating policies or restrictions during your programs in
the DPRK?
9. Would it be possible for a new organization to begin programs in North Korea today?
What steps would an organization have to take to gain access?
10. What are the biggest misconceptions people have about doing aid work in the
DPRK?
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APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR AN EXPERT

1. When and how did foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) begin interacting
with North Korea?
2. Is there any indication of how officials within North Korea felt about the opening of
the country to NGOs? Have opinions within North Korea changed concerning NGOs?
3. How does North Korea regulate the NGOs operating in the country today? What are
the sources of those regulations (do they come from laws, negotiations between groups
and government, etc.)?
4. How have those regulations changed since NGOs first entered the country?
5. The situation of South Korean NGOs is different. How do they operate considering
the restrictions preventing South Koreans from entering North Korea?
6. In what ways have NGOs been successful in interacting with the North Korean
government? In what ways have NGOs been unsuccessful in interacting with the
government of North Korea?
7. Do NGOs have any impact on the policies of the North Korean government towards
foreign organizations? If they do impact policy, in what ways?
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8. Is there competition to form relationships with NGOs between different divisions of
the North Korean government? Does that impact relationships between NGOs and North
Korea in a substantial way?
9. What do you think are some of the biggest misconceptions about the way North Korea
regulates foreign NGOs working in the country?
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APPENDIX C

MAP OF NORTHEAST ASIA
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